




International Biological Threat Reduction at Sandia

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July 31, 2006


www.biosecurity.sandia.gov

Outline


- Sandia's International Biological Threat Reduction program
- Historical biological weapons threat and how the US Government has addressed it
- Evolution of the biological threat and the recent development of new threat reduction programs




Bacillus anthracis



Ricin



Yersinia pestis



Nipah virus



Francisella tularensis




Smallpox virus

Sandia's International Biological Threat Reduction (IBTR) Program

- **Sandia IBTR mission**
 - Enhance United States national security by reducing biological threats globally
- **Biological threats to US national security**
 - Bioterrorism
 - Biological weapons proliferation
 - Naturally occurring highly infectious disease



Technology Spectrum



**Technical advisers to policy makers
in science and international security**

New Sandia Department in 2004

- **Multidisciplinary professional staff**
 - Biophysics/chemistry/toxinology
 - Microbiology/bacteriology
 - Large animal veterinary medicine/physiology
 - Small animal veterinary medicine/epidemiology
 - Cellular biology/genetics
 - Toxicology
 - International security and BW nonproliferation expertise
 - Physical protection, security and counter-terrorism expertise
 - Information security/information technology expertise
 - Software engineering
 - Multiple foreign languages
 - MBA/project administration

- **Rely on extensive technical reach-back capability at Sandia**
 - Active collaborations with 4200, 5900, 6200, 6400, 6900, 8300

International Engagement To Date




History of Biological Weapons

- **1346: Tartar invaders catapulted plague-infected bodies over city walls during siege of Kaffa**
- **1763: British soldiers distributed blankets used by smallpox victims to Native Americans during French and Indian Wars**
- **World War I**
 - **Germany, France - anti-livestock sabotage**
- **World War II – 1972**
 - **Japan, USSR, US, UK, Canada**
 - **Japanese use against Chinese targets**
 - **Alleged USSR use against German soldiers**
- **Intent and effect of BW use was tactical, not strategic (influence battle, not war)**



Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

- Prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons agents, toxins, equipment, and means of delivery by State Parties
- Opened for signature April 1972; entered into force March 1975
 - 171 State Parties (16 signatories have not ratified; 23 non-signatory nations)
- No provisions for verification of compliance
 - Dual-use nature of biological materials, technologies, and expertise present significant challenges
 - Extreme difficulty of discerning between legitimate and illegitimate biological research



Fermentation Vessels



Failure of the BWC

- **Biopreparat: The civilian arm of the Soviet biological weapons program**
 - Established *after* Soviet accession into the BWC
 - 40 – 50 facilities with up to 60,000 employees
- **Other incidents**
 - Iraq research program prior to 1991 Gulf War
 - Assassination of Bulgarian dissident
 - Alleged South Africa program to assassinate anti-apartheid activists
- **Other suspected BW programs since 1972**
 - Iran, North Korea, Syria, Sudan, Cuba




Production Facility in Kazakhstan



Munitions in Iraq

Terrorist Uses of Biological Weapons

- **Rajneeshees – 1984**
 - Contaminated restaurant salad bars in The Dalles, Oregon with salmonella spp. bacteria




*Bhagwan
Shree
Rajneesh*



*Aerosolization of *Bacillus anthracis* and botulinum toxin by Aum Shinrikyo*


- **Aum Shinrikyo – 1990s**
 - Aerosolized and disseminated biological agents in Tokyo
 - Vaccine strain of *Bacillus anthracis*
 - Inactive strain of *Clostridium botulinum*

- **US anthrax attacks – 2001**
 - Highly refined: 4-7 letters contaminated over 60 different sites
 - Highly virulent: killed 5, wounded 21




Amerithrax

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-10

- 
- ***Biodefense for the 21st Century (also NSPD-33), April 2004***
 - “Biological weapons in the possession of hostile states or terrorists pose unique and grave threats to the safety and security of the United States and our allies.”
 - “The United States will continue to use all means necessary to prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological weapons attacks perpetrated against our homeland and our global interests.”
 - **Essential pillars of our national biodefense program are**
 - Threat Awareness
 - Prevention and Protection
 - Surveillance and Detection
 - Response and Recovery

US Policy to Counter the Biological Weapons Threat

- **\$36B since 2001**
- **Biodefense**
 - Enhance the ability of the US to respond to the next bioterrorist attack
 - A *domestic* strategy designed to reduce the consequences of bioterrorism
- **Biological weapons nonproliferation**
 - An *international* strategy designed to prevent the development, use, and spread of biological weapons by states



Biodefense

- **Rapid USG biodefense budget increase**
 - \$1.5B in FY01
 - \$6.5B/year average in FY02-05
 - \$8B in FY06; \$8B requested in FY07
- **Broad technical applications**
 - Diagnostics and disease surveillance
 - Detection and sensor technologies
 - Emergency response capabilities
 - Decontamination and remediation technologies
 - Public and agricultural health capacities
 - Vaccines and therapies



- **Significant gaps exist in the short term**
 - Inadequate countermeasures for all threat agents
 - Limited detection and attribution capabilities
 - Infrastructure not prepared for attack

Biological Weapons Nonproliferation

- **Represents only 2% of the USG budget to counter biological weapons**
 - \$61M in FY01
 - \$127M/year average in FY02-FY06
- **US BWNP programs have focused on bilateral engagement with countries that had offensive weapons programs**
 - Engage Russia and the republics of the Former Soviet Union
 - Support and strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
 - Impose export controls



Evolution of the Biological Threat

- **The biological threat has evolved in concert with**
 - Increasing emergence and reemergence of highly infectious disease
 - Advance of biotechnology globally
 - Rise of transnational, asymmetric terrorism
- **This recent “globalization” of the biological threat has broadened the availability of materials, technologies, and expertise needed to maliciously disseminate infectious disease**

Mt. Merapi, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Infectious Disease

- Global outbreaks of emerging and reemerging infectious disease present a growing threat to international security
- Most dangerous infectious diseases are often tropical diseases that emerge in developing countries
- Infectious diseases now spread across borders as never before
- Natural outbreaks represent unpredictable sources of dangerous pathogens for terrorists




SARS virus




FMD outbreak UK

WHO Outbreak Reports for Emerging Infectious Diseases 1996-2000




WHO Outbreak Reports

for Emerging Infectious Diseases 2001-2005




Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

- H5N1 strain of highly pathogenic avian influenza first emerged in 1997 and has spread to over 50 countries
 - Over 229 people infected, at least 131 fatalities
 - Has also infected other mammals
- Sequencing of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus revealed that H5N1 is very similar (*Taubenberger 2005*)
 - Unlike the strains of the 1958, 1967 pandemics




Avian influenza virus




- The virus is evolving
 - Strain in Turkey had mutations that made it more adapted to humans than birds
 - Strain in Vietnam resistant to Tamiflu®
 - Confirmed human-to-human transmission in Indonesia


Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1—1997




Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1—2003




Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1—2004



Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1—2005



Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1—2006





Biotechnology and the Life Sciences

- Rapid expansion of bioscience worldwide is perhaps the most significant influence on the biological threat
- Viable and virulent organisms are stored and used in more legitimate bioscience facilities across the globe than ever before
- Individuals with the expertise necessary to misuse biology can be found in nearly all areas of the life sciences internationally
- The tools necessary to develop and disseminate a low-grade biological weapon are ubiquitous



Double-Edge Sword of Biotechnology

- **Genetic modification**
 - 2001 – IL-4 and mousepox (Australia)
 - 2003 – IL-4 and mousepox (St. Louis)
- **Chemical synthesis**
 - 2002 – polio virus (Stony Brook)
 - 2003 – phi-X174 virus (Venter)
 - 2005 – 1918 influenza virus (Taubenberger)




9 AUGUST 2002 VOL 297 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org



- **Advance of biotechnology will ease**
 - Acquisition barriers
 - Production barriers
 - Dissemination barriers

Large Biotechnology Industry and Clusters of Expertise, 2004-2005



Transnational Terrorism


- Well financed and sophisticated terrorism has risen sharply over the last 15-20 years
- Terrorists engage in asymmetric warfare – employing unconventional tactics which experts believe will increasingly focus on acquiring and using WMD
- Terrorists are active in regions with expanding biotechnology and outbreaks of infectious disease
- Al Qaeda has repeatedly expressed interest in biological weapons
 - Osama bin Laden (1998): acquiring WMD is a “religious duty”
 - December 2001: cache of technical books, journal papers, rudimentary equipment found at abandoned training camp near Kandahar





Challenges to Preventing Bioterrorism

- **Experts believe that the bioterrorist threat is more significant than the state BW proliferation threat**
- **Building blocks for biological weapons are dual use**
 - **Materials**
 - **Technologies**
 - **Expertise**
- **Attempts to control biological expertise, information, equipment, and technology would stymie the advance of science and harm the fight against infectious diseases**
- **Limiting step for most bioterrorists is acquiring the viable and virulent pathogen**
 - **Dangerous pathogens are widely distributed but tend to exist in specific natural environments, facilities and transport systems**
- **Legitimate bioscience must continue to work with dangerous pathogens**
 - **Protecting legitimate bioscience globally is a critical prevention measure to reduce the bioterrorist threat**



US Domestic Efforts to Reduce Access to Dangerous Biological Materials

- Realization that bioscience facilities are potential sources of biological weapons material
- USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 – US Public Law 107-55
 - Restricted Persons
- Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 – US Public Law 107-188
 - US Select Agent Rule
 - Hazardous Material transport security
- No international standards for managing dangerous pathogens internationally



*National Animal Disease Center,
Ames, Iowa*



*Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia*

International Biological Threat Reduction at Sandia

- **Program objective: Mitigate biological risks caused by highly infectious disease agents—internationally**
 - Enhance safety and security of dangerous pathogens and toxins in legitimate bioscience operations
 - Strengthen capacities to detect and control infectious disease

- **Technical implementation**
 - Agent risk assessment to identify high risk agents
 - Laboratory biosecurity and biosafety to address pathogens in specific facilities
 - Transport biosecurity and biosafety to address pathogens in transit
 - Pathogen and disease surveillance to identify outbreaks of disease caused by high risk agents
 - Modern molecular diagnostics to accelerate detection and to reduce the reliance on live pathogens
 - Outbreak control measures to control natural sources of high risk agents



Current US International BWNP Efforts



- **Russia, the Newly Independent States, Iraq, and Libya**
 - Executed by the Departments of State and Defense

A world map with a color-coded legend. The legend is a red box in the bottom right corner containing the following text:

- Booming biotech industry
- Infectious disease outbreaks
- Terrorist activity
- Inadequate national resources

The map shows the following color-coding:

- Red:** Includes South America (primarily Brazil, Argentina, and Chile), the Middle East (including Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia), and large parts of Asia (including China, India, and Southeast Asia).
- Yellow:** Includes Russia and the Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan).
- Grey:** Includes North America (USA and Canada), Europe, Africa, and Australia.

A yellow box in the top left corner of the map contains the text: "US BWNP work in the FSU, Iraq, and Libya".

- **Booming biotech industry**
- **Infectious disease outbreaks**
- **Terrorist activity**
- **Inadequate national resources**
- **Government instability**

New Department of State Program in 2006

- **DOS Biosecurity Engagement Program concerned about terrorists exploiting legitimate bioscience to pursue bioterrorism**
 - Not looking for state-based offensive weapons programs, weapons caches, or terrorists developing weapons
- **DOS working with legitimate bioscientists and law enforcement officials around the world to**
 - Ensure safe and secure use of dangerous biological agents
 - Strengthen capacities to detect and control infectious disease
- **Method: build relationships, share technical expertise, and promote good practices**



*New Department of
State Global Program
(www.bepstate.net)*

***US national security interest to help international community
manage dangerous pathogens and control infectious disease***

Summary

- **US Government focuses on improving our ability to *respond* to the next bioterrorist attack at home**
 - Much less emphasis on *preventing* bioterrorism attacks
- **The biological threat has evolved in concert with**
 - Increasing emergence and reemergence of highly infectious disease
 - Advance of biotechnology globally
 - Rise of transnational, asymmetric terrorism
- **Evolution of the threat has compelled the US Government to develop new policies and programs that focus on protecting dangerous pathogens and strengthening legitimate bioscience worldwide**
- **Sandia is playing a leading role in this new and growing field**
 - Sandia technical expertise should continue to expand and diversify to meet this challenge